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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
P. E. ASHTON COMPANY,

Plaintiff,
VS.

RUSSELL J. JOYNER ,
· Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

CASE
NO. 26,367

UNITED PACIFIC INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Third Party Defendant

and Respondent.

IRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

This is an action by third party plaintiff against the
third party defendant, his insurance carrier. The plaintiff, appellant herein contends that his automobile insurance covers certain damages to his automobile. The re-

2

spondent contends that it does not by reason orf a certain
exclusion rider attached to the policy. The appellant fur.
tiler contends that, notwithstanding the exclusion provision, the respondent is liable to the appellant by reason
of an accord.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court :f."irst held in favor of the appellant. A
motion was made by the respondent for a new trial and
to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
court granted the motion of the respondent in part and
amended its findings, conclusions and judgment and found
in favor orf the respondent. From this decision the appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's judgment and an order directing the lower court to enter judgment in favor of the appllant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 18th day of November, 1961, the appellant purchased from the respondent collision insurance
with a comprehensive insurance rider covering a 1958
Dodge 34, ton truck and paid all premiums necessary to
maintain the insurance for a period of one year from that
date. This insurance policy is known as Policy No. ACR
65992 of the United Pacific Insurance Group. (Tr. 35 and
36) This policy (Exhibit 5, Tr. 35) carried a rider which

contained the following language:
"Driver Exclusion.

It is agreed that no insurance

is afforded the named insured, any other insured person, organization, firm or corporation by or under any
provision of the policy or of any endorsement attached
tihe,reto or issued to form a part therof while any automobile covered by the policy is being operated, maintained or used by or under the control of any driver
under the age of 25 other than Rosalee Joyner. All
terms and conditions of the policy to which the endorsement is attached, remain unchanged except as
herein specifically provided."
The policy further defines "insured" as follows:
"Insured means: (a) with respect to the owned auto-mobile, (1) the named insured and (2) if the named
insured is an individual who owns a private passenger
or utility automobile covered herein, any person or
organization other than a person or organization engaged in the automobile business or as a carrier or
bailee for hire maintaining, using or having custody of
the said automobile wi"!}h the permission of the named
insured; (b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, if
the named insured is an individual who owns a private
passenger or utility automobile covered herein: (1)
the named insured, and (2) any relative, provided the
actual use thereof by either such named insured or
relative is with the permission of the owner." (Exhibit 5)
In addition to the general coverage stated above, the
insurance policy had Coverage ID, fire, transportation and
theft, and Coverage E, comprehensive. The terms of the
policy in this respect are as follows:
"COVERAGE D-Fire, Transportation and Theft.
To pay for loss to the owned automobile or if the named
insured is an individual who owns a private passenger

or utility automobile covered herein, to a non-owned
automobile caused (a). by fire or lightning, (b) by
smoke or smudge due to a sudden, unusual and faulty
operation of any fixed heating equipment serving the
premises in which the automobile is located, (c) by
the stranding, sinking, burning, collision or derailment
of any conveyance in or upon which the automoibile
is being transported, or (d) by theft, larceny, robbery
or pilfeTage. (Emphasis added)
COVERAGE E-Comprehensive.
To pay for loss caused other than by collision to rthe

owned automobile or if the named insured is an indi-

vidual who owns a private passenger or utility auto. .
mobile covered herein, to a non-owned automobile.
For ·the purpose of this coverage, breakage of glass
and lo.ss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft,
or larceny, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil
commotion shall not be deemed to be loss caused by
collision." (Emphasis added)
Mr. Joyner did not know of the rider in the policy excluding drivers under the age of twenty-five years. (Tr.
36) This rider was added by the agent and was never
mentioned to the appellant prior to the accident. (Tr. 36)
On or about September 10, 1962, the son of the appellant, Jimmy Joyner, was thirteen years of age and was
in the company of one David Martin who was of the age
of 15 years. (Tr. 34) On the day that the vehicle was
taken, the appellant, Mr. Joyner, had left for Washington,
D. C., and his wife had driven him to the airport in Salt
µake. (Tr. 37) The keys to the truck were left in the
house~

By stipulation of counsel the depositions of Jimmy
Joyner, David Martin and Bobby Jorgenson were introduced as part of the record in lieu of their actual testimony
at trial. (Tr. 32) Reference to their depositions and page
numbers will be as follows, respectively:
J. J. p.
; David Martin, D. M. p.
Jorgenson, B. J. p. _ __
1

Jimmy Joyner:
; and Bobby

After his parents had gone, Jimmy, without permission,
took the keys from the house and gave the keys to David
Martin who backed the truck out of the driveway. The
reason David Martin drove the truck out the driveway was
that Jimmy did not know how to back it. David drove
the truck with Jimmy as a passenger to Rodney Jorgenson's house. (D.M., p. 5) This was five or six blocks
away. At Rodney's house, Jimmy became the driver and
the three persons, Jimmy Joyner, David Martin and Rodney Jorgenson took the truck on an unauthorized excursion. All of the boys knew Jimmy Joyner did not have
permi~ioo to take the truck.
(J. J. p. 3, 4; D. M. p. 4; R.
J. p. 8)
They drove around Provo for some time and then
drove toward the Provo boat harbor on Utah Lake. Jimmy
was unable to control the truck and an accident ensued in
which the truck was damaged to the extent of $1,121.44.
The accident occurred at approximately 8:00 o'clock p. m.
The important testimony concerning taking of the car was
elicited from all three boys in their depositions, which depositions were substituted at the trial. The questions were
asked by Mr. Berry, and the testimony is as follows:·
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Deposttion of Jimmy Joyner, page 4:
"Q Had you ever driven this 1958 Dodge % ton truck
when your father was around prior to the accident?
"A No I had not.
"Q Where did you get the keys to the truck in order
that y01.,1 _could operate it?
"A I think in the house, we used to keep them in a
little bowl in the house. I think I got them out of the inside of the bowl. We had to go in the house, I remembeT
that.
"Q At the time your parents were not in the house?

"A No, they were on the way to Salt Lake. My dad
had to go to Washington, D. C. and my mom was taking
him to the airport.
"Q In Salt Lake City?
"A" Yes.
"Q You took this truck to drive without the permis
sion of your father?
"A Yes.
"Q Had you t?'Ver asked permission to drive his sedan?
"A No.
"Q Had your mother let you drive a car prior to the
date of the accident?
"A- No.
"Q And were you the person who was driving the
truck when the accident happened?
"A Yah."
Deposition of David Martin, page 4:
"Q - Were you with Jimmy at the time he obtained the

1ruck?

1
"A Yes.
"Q Do you know how he got the keys to the truck?
"A They were either in the house or in the truck, I
can't remember.
"Q Did you or Jimmy ask anyone for their pennissiorn to use the truck?
"A No, no one was home.
"Q And do you happen to know where Jimmy's father,
-where his parents were at that time.
"A Yes.
"Q Where?
"A They were going to Salt Lake City.
"Q I see, does Jimmy have any older brothers and
sisters?
"A Yes.
"Q Where were they?
"A I don't know, tlhey were not at home.
"Q They were not at Jimmy's place?
"A No.
"Q What time of night did you take the truck?
"A Seven or eight o'clock, I guess. After it got dark.
"Q Do you know who drove the truck away from the
premises?
"A Yes.
"Q Who was it?
"A Me."
Deposition of Rodney Jorgenson, page 8:
"Q Did Jimmy on the day of this accident have any
conversation with you about how he obtained the truck
that he was driving?
"A No, not conversation. I knew where he got it.
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"Q Did you ask him if he had ·his fathe~"s or mother's
permission to take the truck?

"A

No, I didn't need to.

"Q

Why didn't you need to ask him that?

"A Because I knew his father would nort lert him take
the truck."
Mr. Joyner, the appellant, did not know his son could
drive a vehicle.
Another issue of fact is whether the respondent authorized the repair of the_ vehicle and by so doring entered
intq C!ll_ accord· and satisfaction with the appellant. There
was a disputed issue as to whether the respondent directly
negotiated with P. E. Ashton Company, the plaintiff herein,
for the repair of the appellant's vehicle. Apparently, that

matter was resolved in favor of the respondent and P. E.
Ashton Company to the effect that P. E. Ashton Company
negotiated directly with the appellant and that the third
party defendant was absolved from liability to the plain-

tiff -by

re~

of_ contract.

Notwithstanding that finding, the evidence was to the

effect that the respondent had authorized the appellant to
get his truck repaired at P. E. Ashton Company and by so
doing, had entered into an accord with the appellant. There
was no evidence to the contrary.
The truck was repaired by P. E. Ashton Company.

The appellant believes ·the issues to ·be as hereinafter set
forth under Points I and II.

POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
TIIE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE APPELLANT WAS COVERED BY INSURANCE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
POINT II
TIIE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AN
ACCORD BETWEEN THE APPELLANT M""D RESPONDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TIIE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE APPELLANT WAS COVERED BY INSURANCE
UNDER TIIE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
It is the contention of the appellant that Coverage D
and Coverage E of his insurance policy most accurately fit
the facts and circumstances of this case. The appellant
has authority for coverage both under theft and comprehensive provisions. In either instance the appellant would
be entitled to recover the entire amount of his damage
without the $100.00 deduction provision of the general collision coverage.
It is further the contention of the appellant that the

exclusion rider attached to the policy applies only to the
voluntary letting of the car to a person under the age of
25 years and has no application to an automobile involuntarily taken by a thief, a vandal, or mischievous child. If
a contrary meaning were applicable, then the ,theft and
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vandalism provisions of the policy would be of little or no
effect and would offer little or no coverage, for presumably, it would put upon the appellant the burden of proving that the theft or vandalism was caused by a person
over the age of 25 years. We respectfully submit that this
would be distorting the reasonable meaning of the policy.
We shall take the issue up under the two categories
named in the policy, to-wit: theft and comprehensive.
(a) Theft. All of the cases that interpret the exclusion clause for a driver under a particular age are cases
involving situations where the parent or owner has voluntarily parted with the control of the car to a minor. In
these cases, the Courts have determined that there is a
lack of coverage because of the voluntary nature of the
parting. In situations where there has been a question of
whether there is an actual theft in light of the intent of
the party to permanently deprive the owner of its custody,
the Courts have concluded that this provision should be
liberally construed so as to give the owner coverage in
every case where the general language of the policy might
reasonably apply to the fact situation. For example, in
the case of Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corporation vs.
Aldrich, 1941, 117 Fed 2nd, 774; 133 ALR, 914, the insure<l's automobile was taken without authority by a boy
employed by the insured to wash and simonize the car.
The boy took several of his friends for a ride and upon
his return accidentally wrecked the car about a mile and
a half from the insured's home. The court instructed the
jury that under a theft policy, because of the absence
of the taker's intent criminally to deprive the owner of
his property, it would permit the insurance company, by
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using the word "theft", to evade liability in many cases in
which, under prevailing laws, they would be liable if he
word "larceny" had been used. Such a situation was described as in conflict with general principles that an insurance policy is to be construed against the insurer and
its terms are to be given the meaning which common speech
imports.
Another case is the case of Balmr v. Continental Insurance Company (1942), 155 Kan. 26, 122 P.2d 710.
Here a boy, without the knowledge or consent orf the insured, took the car of the insured for a ride, picked up
other boys and drove it around the area for a little while.
He then allowed one of his friends to drive the car and
the car was wrecked. The fact that the boy appropriated
the car for his own personal use without the owner's consent for as long as he saw fit was viewed as being a loss
to the insured within the coverage of the policy notwithstanding the boy did not intend to permanently deprive the
owner of his property.
The case of Toms v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company (1945) 146 Ohio State 39, 63 NE 2d 909, stated that
theft is of a broader scope than larceny and comprehends
essentially the wilful taldng or appropriation of one person's property by another wrongfully and without justification and with the design to make use of such property
in violation of the right of the owner. In this case, an
employee of the insured, without authorization from the
insured and over the protests of a co-employee, drove from
the insured's garage and was involved in an accident whereby the automobile was damaged. In this case the court
determined that the insurance company was responsible
for the loss.
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Other cases to the same effect are Donges vs. American Auto and Fire Insurance Company, 97 NE 2d 108;
Hoyne v. Buckeye Union Casualty Company, 69 NE 2d
163.
The appellant respectfully submits that the only reasonable interipretation of the contract rider was that it
was to apply to situations where the insured voluntarily
let a person under the age of 25 years drive the vehicle
in derogation of the terms of the policy. Any other interpretation would be a distortion of the general intent of the
parties and an injustice.
(b) Comprehensive. There are a limited number
of cases that interpret this type of a fact situation. Of
the cases that have so considered the situation, perhaps
the most analogous are the following: In the case of Unkelsbee v. Homestead Fire Insurance Company, 1945, Municipal Court Appeals, District of Columbia, 41 Atlantic
2nd, 168, the situation was that the plaintiff had parked
his automobile facing downhill with the right front wheel
turned at an angle against the curb, the handbrake on,
the gears engaged, the ignition locked, and the keys thereto
in the personal possession of the Plaintiff, and the car
doors unlocked. Without the knowledge or consent of the
plaintiff and in his absence, a 3% year oJd child entered
the car, caused it to start down the hill, and attempted to
steer it so that it proceeded across an intersection street
and bus route and into the next block, a total distance of
more than one city block, wherein it was stopped and damaged by colliding with another automobile which was
parked at the curb. The Court was of the opinion that
the proximate cause of the loss was the act of vandalism
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on the part of the child, that this came within the comprehensive coverage for theft or vaidalism and not within
the provision excluding loss caused by collision.
Another case of similar import is the case of Great
American Insurance Company v. !Dedmon, 260 Ala. 30, 70
Southern 2nd 421. This was an action against the insUTance company brought under the automobile comprehen-sive coverage including vandalism. It appeared that ithe
automobile was upset by one having a past history of dementia praecox. The Plaintiff had left his automobile
parked in front of a hotel with the ignition locked and the
key in his pocket. Sometime after 11:00 o'clock on the.
night of July 13, 1952, the plaintiff's 20 year old soo, Larry
Dedmon, came to the place where the car was parked and
in some way started the engine and drove the car to the
place where it was overturned and badly damaged. Larry
Dedmon, the plaintiff's son, previously had been suffering
from a mental disorder. The Court stated:
"It is generally conceded that the collision clause in
such policies, like all insurance contracts, should be

construed most strongly against the insurer; this upon
the sound basis of reason that the form of contract
is made by him inrtended to the public."

•• •

"We do not feel that we should here construe the word
vandalism in its narrowest sense, but hold that the
proper construction should be such as is considered
in the proper mind."
Ln this case, the Court concluded that the act of Dedmon'~
son was an oot of vandalism and came within the purview
of his policy.
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The appellant believes that the cases generally support the conduct of the appeHant's son in this case to be
an act of vandalism that would come within the comprehensive coverage provisions of the policy if it were not
foc the exclusion of drivers under the age of 25 years.
1

Assuming that we have established the area in which
the policy would apply we must then address ourselves to
the question of the application of the exclusion provision.
In this field there are few, if any, cases in point for reason that most policies do not: carry such exiclusion provision and there has been very little litigation on the subject. As mentioned above, all of rthe cases ,that interpret
this exclusion clause, so far as the appellant could discern,
are cases wherein the insured has voluntarily parted with
the possession of the car to a person within the age exclusion. Even in these cases, the Courts have made a
strenuous effort to impose liability on the insurance company wherever the facts could be interpreted to impose
liability. Cases in support of this view are as follows:
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, .APPT v. Habib
Etoch, 174 Arkansas, 409; 295 SW, 376. In this case, the
driver of a delivery truck took with him an 11 year old
boy as a companion. At one time during the course of
his deliveries he left the 11 year oJd boy in charge of the
truck while he entered a building on business. A stranger
had requested the boy to move the truck and the boy attempted to move the truck in compliance with the request
of the stranger and thereby damaged the truck. The policy carried an exclusion provision for persons operating
the truck under the age oif 16 years. The Court, in interpreting the policy, had the following to say:
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"The purpose in taking out the insurance was to provide indemnity against damages caused by the operation of the truck, of course, and since it was left
standing temporarily by the regular driver, while he
went into the hotel or barber shop to attend to some
duties there, and since the boy who was requested. to
watch the truck had no authority whatever .from him
01" his employer to mo\re it, the owner of the truck
is no more liable to the payment of damages caused
by the unauthorized movement nor the insurance
company any less liable to the payment of indemnity
therefor than if the truck had been accidentally started by some other car bumping ~gainst it and the
damage thereby caused; in other words, that within
the meaning of the provisions of the policy the truck,
while standing at the curb until the driver could discharge the necessary duties inside the building, was
being operated by him within the meaning of that
clause in the policy."
It is easily seen from the language of the Court that
possession of the truck was not given to the boy ;for the

purpose of driving it and that the boy had no pennission
or authority to drive the truck. The key to the decision,
therefore, was permission or authocity. 'J\his case is identical to the instant case from this standpoint.
The Court has, in other cases, overcome the exclusion provision of the contract for the benefit of the insured. Those cases are Bailey v. USF & G Company, 185
SC 169; 193 SC 638; Raptis v. USF&G,
West Virguua
, 156 SE 53; Johnson v. Travelers Insurance
Company, 147 Oregon 345, 32 P2d 587.
The purpose of exclusion clauses are to reduce the
cost of coverage in situations where the insured agrees not

lti

to let persons under specific ages drive the vehicle. The
entire tenor of this agreement is based upon the voluntary letting of the vehicle to drivers of a youthful age.
Th.is is because statistics have proven that the chances of
accident are greater in the case of youthful drivers. The
provision was never intended to apply to cases oftheft and
comprehensive damage. In this situation, the owner has
no control over the act orf vandalism, malicious mischief
or theft of a minor or juvenile. The purpose of these exclusion provisions is set forth in 5 Am. Jur., 33, Sec. 31.
In this treatise nowhere is there any suggestion that the
exclusion provision is to apply to theft or comprehensive
coverage or situations beyond the control of the insured.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AN
ACCORD BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT.
The appellant herein contends that Finding of Fact
No. 5 of the Court's amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is wholly in derogation of the facts proven.
It is the opinion of the appellant that the admissions of
the respondent's agents show conclusively an accord and
that under the circumstances therein the appellant would
be en,titled to judgment by this reason alone.
The appellant called one Donald Kind (Tr. 50) who
testified that he was a claim adjuster for the United Pacific Insurance Company on September 10, 1962. He testified that he had authority to settle the claim orf Mr. Joyner's, the appellant herein, and that it had been assigned to
him to handle.
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Mr. Kind admitted, (Tr. 52) that at the time he wrote
a letter, Exhibit 7, that he believed the insurance company
would pay the bill charged by the Plaintiff, P. E. Ashton
Company. They, in that letter, stated that they had rec·2ived the final billing from P. E. Ashton Company and
asked him to sign the release. This, the appellant takes
to be an accord concerning the issue of liability. Mr.
Joyner did not sign the rele·ase because the release was
for collision coverage in the amount of $1,013.49 and not
in the amount of $1,121.47 whlch would be the amount
of his coverage under comprehensive. (Tr. 43) He so
advised Mr. Kind.
Mr. Kind testified that it was not until he had received
a copy of Mr. Berry's letter orf February 11, 1963, (Defendant's Exhibit 8) that he had any reason to believe
that the claim of the appellant would not be paid. (Tr. 52)
It should be noted as a matter of admitted fact that

Raymond M. Berry, the attorney for the appellant, is also
the local claims manager for the appellant. Up until the
time of Mr. Berry's letter, both Mr. Kind, the adjuster for
the company, and Mr. Joyner felt that there was an agreement as to liability and the issue is one of whether it was
covered by the collision aspects of the policy or the comprehensive aspects of the policy.
Mr. Joyner testified that he had conversations with
Mr. Albert Bowen who was the sales agent for the company and through whom the company dealt from time to
time in conveying messages to Mr. Joyner. Mr. Bowen's
insurance agency was at Pleasant Grove, Utah. (Tr. 53)
Mr. Joyner testified that Mr. Bowen had told him in SeptembcT of 1962. shortly after the accident, to have the
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truck repaired and for him to take it to P. E. Ashton
Company. Mr. Joyner testified that he assumed that Mr.
Albert Bowen had authorized P. E. Ashton Company to
repair the truck. T'he testimony is undisputed that P. E.
Ashton Company sent the bill to the respondent when t!he
truck was repaired as a result in information that was
given to it by someone other than the appellant. (Tr.
24 and 25) In this ·respect, Mr. Neil Kershner, P. E. Ashton's foreman, said that the information concerning the
billing and where it was to be sent was given to him or
to his company by Mr. Don Kind, the insurance adjuster.
(Tr. 25) In any event, Mr. Kershner, Mr. Joyner, Mr.
Kind, and Mr. Bowen all admit contact with P. E. Ashton
Company concerning the repair of the truck.

Mr. Bowen, the agent of the respondent company, testified that before the truck was repaired, he had a telephone conversation with Mr. Kind concerning the repair
of Mr. Jo~er's truck and that the conversation was in
substance as follows: (Tr. 56)
"Q Will you tell us in substance the conversation?
"A Well, all I can remember, asked me if it was all
right for me to go ahead and start the repairs and indi-

cated it was.
"Q Start the repairs on the truck?
"A Yes.
"Q He told you that it was, is that correct?
"A To the best of my knowledge it's correct.
"Q What did you do as a result of this conversation?
By that, I am asking did you call P. E. Ashton Company
and tell them?
"A I can't remember for sure.

I know I told Russ
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it was all right to go ahead, though.
I called P. E. Ashtons or not.

I can't remember if

"Q But you did inform Mr. Joyner it was all right to
get the truck repaired?
"A Yes."

On cross-examination Mr. Bowen testified as follows
in response to questions asked him by Mr. Berry: (Tr. 57)
"Q The phone conversation you are refevring to was
with Mr. Kind in Salt Lake from your ofiice in Pleasant
Grove?
"A Yes.
"Q That was along in September right after the accident?
"A It would have been soon after, because the reason I made the phone call and the reason I wanted to get
something done on it was because Mr. Joyner wanted to
get the truck fixed to take hunting if he possibly could.
"Q Did you find out if an appraisal had been made on
the vehicle? Actually isn't that what-

Mr. Howard: Just a minute.
question. Let him answer if he can.

You asked him a

"A Would you state that again?
"Q (By Mr. Berry) Did you find Mr. Kind and find
out if there had been an appraisal made on the truck?
"A No, I can't remember."
The respondent did not introduce any evidence contrary to the testimony of Joyner, Kind and Bowen to the
effect that the respondent admitted liability and would
have the truck repaired, except the letter of Mr. Berry
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dated February 11, 1963, Defendant's E~hibit 8. The
truck was repaired in September and October of 1962, and
delivered to the appellant in October of 1962. The appellant believes that the record is absolutely devoid of any
evidence to refute an accord. The law in respect to what
is an accord is rather fundamental, and, therefore, the
appellant cites to the Court text material for definition
purposes only. The substance of the material is that an
accord is an agreement for giving and ta~ing a thing in
satisfaction of an existing debt or claim. The satisfaction
is the actual giving and taking of such thing. 1 Am. Jur.
215, Sec. 1, Re-statement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 417,
Corbin on Contracts, page 1041, Sec. 1276.
Under the law, the appellant believes that an accord
was established when the respondent agreed to repair the
vehicle of the appellant and the only issue was whether the
coverage would be under the collision provisions m the
policy or the comprehensive provision of the policy. All
other disputes were resolved by this agreement. The appellant relied upon the agreement, delivered his car to the
plaintiff for repair, incurred obligations of $1,121.44, and
is entitled to satisfaction from the respondent in this
amount.
CONCLUSION

The appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and order that judgment be entered in favor of the appellant in the amount
of $1,121.44.
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Respectfully submitted,

JACKSON B. HOWARD, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 3rd North
Provo, Utah

